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Swedish Intervention and the Krona Float, 1993-2002 
 
By Owen Humpage and Javiera Ragnartz 
 
 
Using a set of standard success criteria, we show that Riksbank foreign-exchange interventions 
between 1993 and 2002 lacked forecast value; that is, the observed number of successes was not 
significantly greater—and usually substantially smaller—than the number one would anticipate given 
the martingale nature of exchange-rate movements.  Under some success criteria, the Riksbank 
exhibited negative forecast value, implying that the market could have profited by taking a position 
opposite that of the bank.  Moreover, the likelihood of success was independent of such conditioning 
factors as the amount of a transaction, the time lapses between interventions, or the number of foreign 
currencies involved.  As such, Riksbank intervention could not operate through an expectations or 
signaling channel.    
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  In November 1992, the Swedish Riksbank abandoned its currency peg and 
allowed the krona to float for the first time since the 1930s.  Nevertheless, the Riksbank 
has often intervened when exchange rates seemed inconsistent with market fundamentals 
or when exchange rates appeared excessively volatile.  With an overnight interest-rate-
target guiding its monetary policy, however, the Riksbank automatically sterilizes its 
foreign-exchange transactions.   Because sterilized foreign-exchange intervention has no 
effect on monetary variables, or other basic macroeconomic determinants of exchange 
rates, economists have long questioned its effectiveness.   
Overall, the existing research has failed to show that sterilized intervention 
provides monetary authorities with an instrument for systematically determining 
exchange rates independent of their other monetary-policy objectives, but the empirical 
literature clearly indicates that intervention sometimes provokes the desired exchange-
rate response, at least in the short term.  (Sarano and Taylor 2001, Baillie, Humpage, and 
Osterberg 2000, Almekinders 1995, and Edison 1993 survey the literature.)  These 
empirical studies have not isolated the mechanism or channel through which sterilized 
operations might affect exchange rates, but economists offer two possibilities.  Some 
suggest that because information is costly, official intervention may sometimes affect 
traders’ expectations by “signaling” new information to the market.
1  When a monetary 
authority takes an open position in a foreign currency, it has—like any speculator—an 
expectation about an imminent change in that currency, which is based on private 
information.  That information may include priority knowledge of impending monetary-
1  
policy changes or an informed interpretation of generally available data (see Montgomery 
and Popper, 2001).  If the monetary authority has superior information, knowledge that it 
is intervening will cause private traders to alter their prior estimates of near-term 
exchange-rate movements.  Others suggest that interventions—especially large 
transactions—might temporarily affect exchange rates as market makers shuffle their 
inventories to cover their positions in the wake of an official purchase or sale of foreign 
exchange (see Evans and Lyons 2001 and Lyons 2001).  Market makers generally do not 
like to maintain sizable open positions, especially overnight, and will alter their quotes to 
eliminate their exposure (see Cheung and Chinn 2001).  If the monetary authority 
sterilizes its transactions, as is typical, this inventory effect should be temporary, at most.   
In this paper, we examine the forecast value of official Swedish Riksbank 
intervention between January 6, 1993, and November 15, 2002.  We first present a set of 
success criteria that link specific near-term exchange-rate movements (e.g., appreciations 
or depreciations) with same-day interventions.  Then, following Henriksson and Merton 
(1981) and Merton (1981), we test if the number of observed successes exceeds the 
amount that would randomly occur given the martingale nature of exchange-rate changes.  
Interventions that prove successful significantly more often than random have positive 
forecast value, implying that private market participants could benefit from observing the 
central bank in the market.  Similarly, interventions that are successful significantly less 
often than random have negative forecast value, implying that private market participants 
could benefit on average by taking a position opposite that of the central bank.    
We find that official Riksbank sales and purchases of foreign exchange had no 
obvious forecast value.  In fact, under some success criteria the Riksbank demonstrated 
  2 
negative forecast value.  Moreover, we find that particular aspects of the operations, such 
as the size of a transaction, the amount of time that has elapsed since the previous 
transaction, and the number of foreign currencies simultaneously involved in an 
intervention, had no bearing on the likelihood of a success.  These results suggest that 
Swedish intervention generally does not affect exchange markets through an expectations 
(or signaling) channel or through an inventory-adjustment mechanism.    
Our overall results are similar to Aguilar and Nydahl (2000), the only other paper 
to study official Riksbank intervention during the krona float.
2  They investigated daily 
interventions in Swedish kronor against German marks and U.S. dollars from January 7, 
1993, to December 30, 1996, using a multivariate extension of the GARCH-M model and 
found little evidence that Riksbank interventions affected either the level or the volatility 
of day-to-day, krona-dollar or krona-mark exchange rates.  Whether they specified 
intervention in amounts or as a bivariate dummy variable had no bearing on the results.  
They then isolated one-year subperiods.  Using OLS, Aguilar and Nydahl found 
significant effects for both exchange rates—in a manner consistent with the announced 
Riksbank objectives—only in 1995.   For 1996, they found a significant—but negative—
coefficient for intervention against German marks.  This coefficient is not inconsistent 
with the announced policy of leaning against the wind, but it cannot be unambiguously 
interpreted.  Aguilar and Nydahl also find that intervention affects implied volatility as 
computed from option prices for these currencies.  The intervention coefficients are often 
significant, but their signs change from year to year, indicating that intervention 
sometimes increases and sometimes decreases implied volatility.   
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Our paper proceeds as follows:  The next section provides a basic description of 
the official Swedish intervention data.  Section 3 discusses the four specific success 
criteria that we use to evaluate the data and an all-encompassing general success 
criterion.  This section also provides a brief discussion of the timing conventions 
embodied in our methodology.  Section 4 explains the Henderson and Merton test and 
evaluates the forecast value of Riksbank intervention under our five success criteria.  
Section 5 uses probit regressions to see if other events or the way in which the Riksbank 
conducted its interventions influenced the likelihood of success as defined by the general 
success criterion.  Section 6 summaries our results.     
2.  Swedish Interventions 
The Riksbank executes all of its interventions in the local foreign-exchange 
market.  The Swedish currency market is quite small, amounting to only 2.6% of the 
global market (Bank for International Settlements, 2002).  Banks are the main market 
participants with interbank transactions accounting for 95% of total trades.  Furthermore, 
the market is highly concentrated; the three largest players—all domestic banks—account 
for most trading.  In contrast to the turnover in the global foreign-exchange market, 
turnover in the Swedish market has been growing since 1998.  Daily turnover in the spot 
market currently amounts to approximately SEK 36 billion, while daily turnover in the 
whole market amounts to SEK 185 billion.  Normally, traders undertake as much as 85% 
of the spot transactions via electronic brokering.  More than 90% of the spot activity 
concerns the krona-euro exchange rate, while most forward-market transactions involve 
the krona-dollar exchange rate.   
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Between January 6, 1993, and November 15, 2002, the Riksbank intervened in the 
Swedish market on 179 business days; 165 (91%) of these involved transactions in 
German marks or—after December 31, 1998—euros (see table 1).
3  All of these involved 
spot market transactions, but on 5 of these 165 days, the Riksbank also intervened in the 
forward market against German marks.  On 17 of the 165 days, the Riksbank also 
intervened in the spot market against U.S. dollars; and on just 14 other occasions, the 
Riksbank intervened only in dollars.  By far, most interventions were krona purchases, 
suggesting that overall the Riksbank was more likely to react to krona depreciations, 
particularly against the key European currency, than to krona appreciations.   
The Riksbank maintains its intervention data in U.S. dollar equivalents.  The 
median size of an official transaction—$30 million—fell substantially below the average, 
$68 million, because a relatively small number of very large transactions skewed the 
distribution.  Riksbank interventions against dollars were somewhat smaller than 
interventions against German marks and euros.    
Table 2 provides information about the persistence of Riksbank interventions.  
Columns 2 through 5 show the probability of an intervention episode lasting one, two, 
five, or ten days in a row.  These columns indicate that Riksbank purchases of Swedish 
kronor, especially against German marks or euros, were substantially more persistent 
than Riksbank sales of Swedish kronor.  Columns 6 through 9 provide information about 
the lapse of days between episodes of intervention.  These columns show that the typical 
interval between official purchases of kronor against German marks and euros was much 
smaller than the lapse of time between sales of kronor.  This assessment is also generally 
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true about transactions against dollars, but a few very large intervals skew the average for 
purchases of Swedish kronor in this segment of the market.   
Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide an overview of Riksbank interventions.  Figure 1 
presents Riksbank interventions in German marks or euros against movements in the 
krona-mark exchange rate.  (To extend the data beyond 1998, we constructed a notional 
krona-mark exchange rate from the krona-euro rate.)  Figure 2 shows official purchases 
and sales of U.S. dollars against movements in the krona-dollar exchange rate.  The 
Riksbank also evaluates its interventions in terms of a trade-weighted krona index, which 
we show in figure 3 along with total Riksbank interventions against German marks, euro, 
and U.S. dollars.  An increase in the trade-weighted krona indicates a krona depreciation.   
3.  Success Criteria 
  We investigate the efficacy of Swedish interventions using four specific success 
criteria and an aggregate criterion that incorporates the first four.  We count the number 
of successes consistent with each criterion and, following Henriksson and Merton (1981) 
and Merton (1981), evaluate them under the assumption that our success count is a 
hypergeometric random variable.  Leahy (1995) applied the Henriksson and Merton 
procedure to an analysis of the profitability of U.S. intervention.  Humpage (1999, 2000) 
used it to analyze the success of U.S. interventions, and Chaboud and Humpage (2005) 
adopted it to study recent Japanese interventions.   
  The test assumes that the Swedish Riksbank does not directly affect underlying 
exchange-rate fundamentals when it intervenes.  The Swedish Riksbank conducts 
monetary policy using an overnight repurchase-rate target, a procedure that requires the 
Riksbank to automatically sterilize any intervention that alters the supply of bank 
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reserves in breach of the target (see Heikensten and Borg, 2002).  To be sure, the 
monetary authorities could adjust the target interest rate to achieve an exchange-rate 
objective, but then standard desk operations in domestic securities could achieve the new 
interest-rate and corresponding exchange-rate targets without creating a foreign-exchange 
exposure (see Bonser-Neal, et al., 1998 and Humpage 1999).  On only one occasion 
during the krona float, October 9, 1996, did the Riksbank change its target interest rate 
and intervene in a consistent direction.
4  On that date the Riksbank bought dollars and 
lowered its interest-rate target somewhat.  The dollar appreciated against the krona.   
  Although sterilized interventions also alter the currency composition of publicly 
held government debt, empirical evidence suggests that intervention does not affect 
exchange rates through a portfolio-balance channel.  In studies of this mechanism, the 
estimated elasticities are either statistically insignificant or too small to be of practical 
relevance.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993) is a noteworthy exception.  All in all, our 
assumption that Riksbank interventions have no direct effect on underlying 
macroeconomic fundaments seems valid.   
  We do not generally know what criteria the Riksbank uses to evaluate its 
interventions, and these may change from episode to episode.  Although our success 
criteria may not encompass all possibilities, the success criteria that we define below are 
reasonable, frequently mentioned in intervention literature, and readily verifiable.  In 
accordance with the Henriksson and Merton procedure, we define each success criterion 
for purchases and sales of foreign exchange separately.   
  7 
3.1.   Appreciate or depreciate the krona.   
  The first set of success criteria presumes that when the Riksbank buys or sells 
foreign exchange, it expects the krona to immediately appreciate or depreciate, as the 
case may be, against an appropriate exchange rate.  Accordingly, our first success 
criterion for official sales of foreign exchange with kronor is:    
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The corresponding criterion for official purchases of foreign exchange is:    
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 In  these  expressions,  It refers to an intervention on day t, with negative and 
positive values indicating sales or purchases of foreign exchange, respectively.  We 
measure the exchange-rate change, ∆St, over the shortest interval that the data permit.  
For the krona-dollar and the krona-mark exchange rates, we calculate the daily change 
from the opening of the Stockholm market to its close.  All Riksbank interventions occur 
in this time interval.  For the trade-weighted krona index, we measure ∆St as the 
difference between today’s closing rate and yesterday’s closing rate in the Stockholm 
market.  A rise in the trade-weighted krona index indicates a depreciation of the krona.      
3.2.  Reverse the direction of the exchange-rate movement.   
  Our second, more stringent, set of success criteria assumes that when the 
Riksbank intervenes, it expects the krona to reverse its recent depreciation or 
appreciation.  Accordingly, an intervention sale of foreign exchange is successful if:   
3)   
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An intervention purchase of foreign exchange is successful if:  
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3.3.  Accentuate exchange-rate movements. 
  Our third set of success criteria assumes that the Riksbank sells or purchases 
foreign exchange when it believes that a recent krona appreciation or depreciation, as the 
case may be, will proceed at a faster clip. Reflecting this criterion:   
7)   
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3.4.  Moderate exchange-rate movements. 
Empirical estimates of intervention reaction functions typically report that monetary 
authorities attempt to smooth exchange-rate movements or lean against the wind (see 
Edison 1993, Almekinders 1995).  Our final set of individual success criteria tests for this 
possibility.  We assume that the Riksbank takes a position in the foreign-exchange market 
when it expects that a recent appreciation or depreciation has proceeded too quickly, will 
subsequently slow, but will not reverse itself.  Accordingly,  
5)   
⎩
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3.5. General success criteria. 
The following set of general success criteria aggregates the previous criteria:   
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We will use these general success criteria primarily in section 5.    
3.6.  Timing convention. 
Some researchers may find our timing conventions unduly narrow and prone to 
miss relevant exchange-rate developments that occur beyond the event window (see 
Goodhart and Hesse 1993, and Fatum and Hutchison 2002).  We might fail to count an 
intervention successful if the appropriate exchange-rate movement occurs beyond closing 
on day t.  The chances of this type of error seem remote.  Chang and Taylor (1998), 
Chueng and Chinn (2001), and Dominguez (2003), among others, suggest that exchange 
markets begin to respond to intervention within minutes or hours, not days.  So, we 
should capture this movement in at least one of the success criteria even if complete 
adjustment extends beyond a single day.  Alternatively, we may count an intervention 
successful even though the exchange-rate movement that led to that conclusion 
subsequently disappears.  This occurrence is more problematic.  Opening the event 
window, however, quickly causes overlap among interventions, making inferences about 
individual successes impossible.  Consequently, we keep the event window narrow.   
Because exchange-rate changes approximate martingale processes, we interpret 
successful interventions as highly persistent, if not permanent, shocks even though 
interventions often appear to “wear off” in a day or two.  A successful intervention will 
send the exchange rate on an alternate path, but one still consistent with existing and 
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unchanged market fundamentals.  Our methodology cannot answer questions about the 
duration of exchange-rate shocks.   
4.  Forecast Value   
  Given the martingale nature of exchange-rate changes, one would expect to 
observe a fairly high number of intervention successes merely by chance.  To have 
forecast value, the frequency with which a particular exchange-rate pattern and 
intervention coincide—a success—must significantly exceed the frequency with which 
that exchange-rate pattern occurs irrespective of any intervention.  If the krona 
appreciates against the dollar on 50% of the trading days, then one should not be 
surprised to find that 50% of all Riksbank official dollar sales are associated with krona 
appreciations.   
  We evaluate the probability of observing a specific number of successes under the 
assumption that their occurrence is a hypergeometric random variable.  The 
hypergeometric distribution does not require individual events to be independent and 
does not depend on the presumed probability of an individual success.
5  Our null 
hypothesis compares actual and expected successes.  A low p-value indicates positive 
forecast value, and a very high p-value indicates negative forecast value.   
  Tables 3 through 6 present our results.  The exchange rate, the intervention 
currencies, and the sample sizes vary across these four tables.  The krona-mark exchange 
rate, for example, begins on February 4, 1993, while our krona-dollar and our trade-
weighted krona exchange rates start on January 4, 1993.   
The first column of each table lists the five sets of success criteria outlined in the 
previous section.  Notice that the criteria labeled 1a and 1b in the tables create subsets of 
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the first criterion, although their union is not equal to the set described by criterion 1.  
The second column in each table presents a count of the appropriate Riksbank 
interventions for each case, with foreign-exchange purchases and sales against kronor 
shown separately.  Table 3, for example, shows that the Riksbank sold German marks on 
137 days between February 5, 1993, and December 31, 1998, and bought German marks 
on 14 days.
6  Column 3 lists the number of Riksbank interventions that were successful 
according to each criterion, while column 4 records those successes as a percentage of the 
total interventions.  Of the 137 Swedish sales of German marks, for example, only 54, or 
39.4%, were associated with a mark depreciation against the krona, indicating success.   
  The next two columns of tables 3 through 6—labeled virtual successes—describe 
exchange-rate movements independent of intervention.  Column 5 records the number of 
times that the exchange rate moved in conformity with the corresponding success 
criterion, whether or not intervention took place.  Between February 5, 1993, and 
December 31, 1998, for example, the mark depreciated on 741 days relative to the krona, 
counting days with and without official interventions (table 3).  Column 6 expresses the 
data in column 5 as a percentage of the total observations in that sample.  Table 3 
contains 1540 observations, and the mark depreciated 48.1% of the time.  
The next three columns of tables 3 through 6 relate to the hypergeometric 
distribution.  Columns 7 and 8 show the expected number of successes and their standard 
deviations.  The last column in each table shows the p-value associated with the null 
hypothesis: the probability of randomly observing a greater number of successes than we 
actually found. 
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  The results in tables 3 through 6 unanimously suggest that Riksbank purchases 
and sales of foreign exchange lacked positive forecast value as measured under any of the 
success criteria.  Because the Riksbank undertook only 14 purchases of marks and euros, 
only 28 sales of U.S. dollars, and only 3 purchases of U.S. dollars, inferences about the 
forecast values of these transactions are rather tenuous.  Nevertheless, in no case 
throughout tables 3 to 6 does the p-value associated with the null hypothesis fall below 
7%.  Usually the p-values are much higher, indicating—as one can see in the tables—that 
the actual number of successes is far fewer, or at best not significantly higher, than the 
expected number.    
The p-values associated with Riksbank sales of foreign exchange, which by far 
constitute the majority of interventions, are generally very high.  In fact, under the criteria 
appreciate / depreciate and the general success criteria, the p-values almost always 
exceed 95%, suggesting negative forecast value; that is, the market profits on average by 
taking a position opposite that of the central bank.  For those criteria that involve some 
inertia in the exchange rate’s movement—accentuate or moderate of movements—the p-
values drop, but never to a value that might confidently be associated with positive 
forecast value.  Under the criterion of moderate movements, the number of successes 
usually exceeds the expected number, but the difference is never significant.  Using the 
general success criteria to aggregate across all of the criteria, we find that only about half 
of the interventions were successful, but this fraction is much smaller than we would 
expect to randomly observe.   
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5.  Predicting Success   
  The frequencies presented in tables 3 through 6 correspond to unconditional 
probabilities.  Success, however, may be sensitive to the way in which the Riksbank 
conducts its operations—for example, the size or frequency of transactions—and to the 
simultaneous occurrence of other events, such as a change in the central bank’s interest-
rate target.   
We show that successful Riksbank interventions were completely independent of 
such factors.  We base this conclusion on three sets of probit regressions, with sample 
sizes equal to the total number of relevant interventions: 154 against German marks or 
euros, 31 against U.S. dollars, and 179 against marks, euros, or dollars.  In each case, the 
bivariate dependent variable measures success according to the general success criterion 
with purchases and sales now combined.  As noted in section 3, the general success 
criterion subsumes the individual criteria.  Table 7 evaluates Riksbank interventions 
against marks or euros with the krona-mark exchange rate (extended using the euro) as 
the policy target.  (Table 7 corresponds to the counts in table 4.)  Table 8 judges 
Riksbank dollar interventions targeting the krona-dollar exchange rate.  (Table 8 
corresponds to table 5.)  Table 9 considers Riksbank interventions against marks, euros, 
or dollars with the trade-weighted krona as the policy target.  (Table 9 corresponds to 
table 6.)   
  The first four independent variables in probit tables refer to specific aspects of the 
intervention process.  One might expect that large interventions or official transactions 
undertaken after a long period of no activity would have a bigger effect on the market 
than small, frequent interventions.  The large transactions could be important in an 
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inventory-adjustment mechanism, and both size and lapse time could influence an 
information-signaling process.  This was, however, not the case for Riksbank 
interventions.  In none of the three experiments did either the size of the interventions 
(measured in kronor) or the time lapsed since the previous intervention (measured in 
days) have any bearing on the likelihood of success.   
  Similarly, one might expect that undertaking official transactions simultaneously 
in more than one segment of the foreign-exchange market could strengthen a signaling or 
an inventory-adjustment process.  Concurrent dollar interventions do not increase the 
likelihood of success for interventions against marks and euros in table 7 nor for 
interventions against the trade-weighted krona in table 9.  Turning the experiment around 
(table 8), we found that simultaneously intervening against marks or euros had no 
influence on the success of the Riksbank’s dollar interventions.  Similarly, purchasing 
German marks in the forward market, as the Riksbank did on five occasions, had no 
bearing on the likelihood of success (tables 7 and 9).   
  The remaining independent variables in the probit regressions attempt to control 
for factors that can affect krona exchange rates.  These are changes in the repurchase rate, 
announcements of prospective changes in the repurchase rate, change in relevant money-
market interest-rate spreads, and movements in the Stockholm stock index.  One might 
expect that a change in these variables coincident with a Riksbank intervention would 
increase the chance (or the appearance) of success, but none of these variables had any 
bearing on the likelihood that Riksbank interventions would appear successful.  We 
obtain this result even though we define each of these independent variables to 
correspond appropriately with an intervention purchase or sale.  For example, we match 
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increases or announcements of increases in the repurchase rate with intervention sales of 
foreign exchange, since all of these will promote a krona appreciation.  We similarly pair 
changes in money-market interest-rate spreads and changes in the stock market index 
with intervention purchases or sales.     
6.  Conclusions  
  During the krona float, official Riksbank sales and purchases lacked forecast 
value; that is, the observed number of successes, as defined under the various criteria 
listed in this paper, was either smaller or not significantly larger than the number that one 
would have randomly anticipated given the martingale nature of exchange-rate changes.   
In some cases, notably intervention sales of foreign exchange in anticipation of a krona 
appreciation, Riksbank sales had negative forecast value; that is, the market consistently 
seemed to move against the central bank.  These results stand in stark contrast with 
previous studies using a similar technique: Humpage (1999, 2000) and Chaboud and 
Humpage (2005).  Those papers, which investigated U.S. and Japanese interventions, 
found evidence of positive forecast value, although the results were not robust across all 
time periods and definitions of success.  They also found—unlike the present paper—that 
larger interventions had a higher probability of success than small interventions.  On the 
other hand, our results are similar to those of Aguilar and Nydahl (2000), who also found 
that Swedish interventions were generally ineffective.   
The low success count may reflect the interactions between Swedish exchange-
rate interventions and monetary policies.  During the floating-rate period, Swedish 
interventions often seemed incompatible with the general thrust of monetary policy, as 
measured by movements in the repurchase rate (see figure 4).  Throughout 1993, for 
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example, the Riksbank generally sold foreign exchange for kronor while simultaneously 
lowering the repurchase rate.  Although the Riksbank routinely sterilizes its intervention, 
this apparent incompatibility could raise uncertainties about both policies and reduce the 
ability of intervention to affect market expectations.  To test this hypothesis, we 
performed a success count, similar to those in tables 3 through 6, for interventions 
conducted between January 1, 1993, and June 15, 1994, when the Riksbank lowered its 
repurchase rate.  We investigated total intervention in marks and dollars with the trade-
weighted krona as the target rate.  During this period, the Riksbank undertook 100 sales 
of foreign exchange and no purchases.  Sixty percent of these were successful under the 
general success criterion, but the observed number of successes was somewhat lower 
than the expected number.  The results for this period were not, however, substantially 
different from those for the entire sample period; if anything, the success rate was 
marginally higher.  Consequently, the frequent contradiction between the objective of 
intervention and the thrust of Swedish monetary policy does not seem to explain the lack 
of positive forecast value.   
The low success count may also reflect structural aspects of the Swedish foreign 
exchange market and the transparency of Riksbank monetary policy actions.  The 
Swedish market for kronor is relative small and highly concentrated, with three large 
commercial banks dominating the trades.  In such a market, a central bank may not 
possess a particular informational advantage.  It may still signal new private information, 
such as an unanticipated change in monetary policy, but during the floating rate period, 
the Riksbank may have rendered this mechanism redundant by making frequent 
announcements of intended policy changes.  In a small, concentrated market, moreover, 
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the monetary authorities may lose their relative advantage in aggregating existing news, a 
intervention channel that Montgomery and Popper (2001) describe.  Market 
concentration may matter for the success of intervention.   
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1  Mussa (1980) first suggested that central banks might signal future, unanticipated 
changes in monetary policy through their sterilized interventions.  This hypothesis, which 
has not received overwhelming empirical support, may be too narrowly formulated (see 
Baillie, Humpage, and Osterberg 2000).  Intervention could provide information about 
more than just monetary policy.  
2  Lindberg (1994) considered Swedish intervention from 1984 through 1990, the pegged-
rate period.   
3  The counts in the text pertain to the time period January 6, 1993, to November 15, 
2002.  The data in table 1 pertain to the specific time periods listed there.  Table 1 
corresponds to the data in tables 3 through 6.   
4  On two occasions intervention and changes in policy seemed at cross purposes.  On 
February 9, 1993, and May 25, 1993, the Riksbank lowered its target interest rate and 
bought kronor.  Often, the general thrust of policy and intervention seemed at odds (see 
figure 4).   
5  The moments of the hypergeometric distribution are defined in a manner that compares 
days of intervention against the entire sample, rather than against days of no intervention.   
6  Five of the Riksbank purchases of German marks against Swedish kronor involved 
forward transactions.  We did not remove these transactions from the data, since a 
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forward transaction could still have a signaling effect in the spot market.  Forward 
operations would not, however, have an inventory effect in the spot market.  Removing 
these five interventions lowers the success count slightly, but not enough to alter the 
statistical results (see table 3).   
  21Table 1:  Intervention Counts and Basic Statistics
Swedish interventions in all currencies Count Average Median Minimum  Maximum Lower 25% Upper 25%
January 6, 1993, to November 15, 2002 (in millions of U.S. dollars)
Sales of forex; purchases of kronor 163 $68.98 $30.00 $3.00 $460.00 $15.00 $86.00
Purchases of forex; sales of kronor 16 $62.81 $41.50 $3.00 $251.00 $29.75 $89.25
Total (absolute value) 179 $68.43 $30.00 $3.00 $460.00 $15.00 $86.00
No interventions 2394
Observations 2573
Swedish interventions in German marks  Count Average Median Minimum  Maximum Lower 25% Upper 25%
February 4, 1993, to December 31, 1998 (in millions of U.S. dollars)
Sales of marks, purchase of konor 137 $65.32 $30.00 $3.00 $419.00 $15.00 $76.00
Purcases of marks, sales of kronor 14 $64.43 $38.00 $3.00 $251.00 $25.50 $102.50
Total (absolute value) 151 $65.24 $31.00 $3.00 $419.00 $15.00 $78.00
No interventions 1389
Observations 1540
Swedish interventions in German marks or euros Count Average Median Minimum  Maximum Lower 25% Upper 25%
February 4, 1993, to November 15, 2002 (in millions of U.S. dollars)
Sales of marks or euros, purchases of kronor 140 $68.66 $30.00 $3.00 $419.00 $15.25 $84.25
Purchases of marks or euros, sales of kronor 14 $64.43 $38.00 $3.00 $251.00 $25.50 $102.50
Total (absolute value) 154 $68.28 $32.00 $3.00 $419.00 $15.75 $86.50
No interventions 2397
Observations 2551
Swedish interventions in U.S. dollars Count Average Median Minimum  Maximum Lower 25% Upper 25%
January 5, 1993, to November 15, 2002 (in millions of U.S. dollars)
Sales of dollars, purchases of kronor 28 $43.43 $28.00 $3.00 $240.00 $12.75 $50.00
Purchases of dollars, sales of kronor 3 $34.33 $33.00 $30.00 $40.00 $30.00 $40.00
Total (absolute value) 31 $42.55 $30.00 $3.00 $240.00 $15.00 $50.00
No interventions 2543
Observations 2574
Note:  We chose these sample periods to correspond with those in tables 3 through 6.  Table 2:  Probability and Persistence of Intervenition
Number of interventions in a row
1 Days since last intervention 
against German marks
2 1 2 5 10 Mean Median Highest Lowest
purchases of Swedish kronor 8.9% 4.5% 2.1% 1.0% 7.8 1.0 279.0 1.0
sales of Swedish kronor 0.9% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 21.2 3.0 242.0 1.0
against German marks or euros
3 125 1 0
purchases of Swedish kronor 5.5% 2.8% 1.3% 0.6% 12.7 1.0 702.0 1.0
sales of Swedish kronor 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 21.2 3.0 242.0 1.0
against U.S. dollars
4 125 1 0
purchases of Swedish kronor 1.1% 0.5% 0.2% 0% 76.8 2.5 980.0 1.0
sales of Swedish kronor 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.3 9.0 42.0 4.0
against any currency
5 125 1 0
purchases of Swedish kronor 6.3% 3.3% 1.4% 0.7% 12.5 1.0 702.0 1.0
sales of Swedish kronor 0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4 2.0 10.0 1.0
Notes: 
1.  Probabilitiy of intervention conditional on days of consecutive intervention.  
2.  February 5, 1993, to December 31, 1998, 1540 observations
3.  February 5, 1993, to November 15, 2002, 2551 observations
4.  January 5, 1991, to November 15, 2002, 2574 observations
5.  January 6, 1991, to November 15, 2002, 2573 observationsTable 3:  Success Counts for Swedish Intervention against German Marks
February 5, 1993, to December 31, 1998, 1540 observations
Hypergeometric Distribution
Interventions Virtual Expected  Standard
Total Succsessfull Successes Successes Deviation p-value
Success criteria: ##% # % # #
1.  Appreciate / depreciate
Marks sold, kronor purchased 137 54 39.4 741 48.1 65.9 5.6 0.980
Marks sold, kronor purchased
1 132 51 38.6 741 48.1 63.5 5.5 0.986
Marks purchased, kronor sold 14 1 7.1 791 51.4 7.2 1.9 0.999
     1a.  Change direction
Marks sold, Kronor purchased 137 25 18.2 362 23.5 32.2 4.7 0.924
Marks sold, Kronor purchased
1 132 24 18.2 362 23.5 31.0 4.7 0.922
Marks purchased, kronor sold 14 1 7.1 362 23.5 3.3 1.6 0.877
     1b.  Accentuate movements
Marks sold, kronor purchased 137 16 11.7 188 12.2 16.7 3.7 0.513
Marks sold, kronor purchased
1 132 14 10.6 188 12.2 16.1 3.6 0.665
Marks purchased, kronor sold 14 0 0.0 221 14.4 2.0 1.3 0.887
2.  Moderate movements
Marks sold, kronor purchased 137 19 13.9 202 13.1 18.0 3.8 0.334
Marks sold, kronor purchased
1 132 18 13.6 202 13.1 17.3 3.7 0.365
Marks purchased, kronor sold 14 3 21.4 188 12.2 1.7 1.2 0.081
3.  General success
Marks sold, kronor purchased 137 73 53.3 947 61.5 84.2 5.4 0.975
Marks sold, kronor purchased
1 132 69 52.3 947 61.5 81.2 5.3 0.985
Marks purchased, kronor sold 14 4 28.6 983 63.8 8.9 1.8 0.992
Total: 151 77 51.0
Notes: Target currency is the German mark
1.  Five forward mark sales removed.  Table 4:  Success Counts for Swedish Intervention against Marks or Euro  
February 5, 1993, to November 15, 2002, 2551 observations
Hypergeometric Distribution
Interventions Virtual Expected  Standard
Total Succsessfull Successes Successes Deviation p-value
Success criteria:  ##% # % # #
1.  Appreciate / depreciate
Forex sold, kronor purchased 140 56 40.0 1205 47.2 66.1 5.7 0.954
Forex purchased, kronor sold 14 1 7.1 1336 52.4 7.3 1.9 1.000
     1a.  Change direction
Forex sold, kronor purchased 140 25 17.9 599 23.5 32.9 4.9 0.938
Forex purchased, kronor sold 14 1 7.1 598 23.4 3.3 1.6 0.875
     1b.  Accentuate movements
Forex sold, kronor purchased 140 17 12.1 298 11.7 16.4 3.7 0.368
Forex purchased, kronor sold 14 0 0.0 382 15.0 2.1 1.3 0.897
2.  Moderate movements
Forex sold, kronor purchased 140 19 13.6 349 13.7 19.2 4.0 0.454
Forex purchased, kronor sold 14 3 21.4 303 11.9 1.7 1.2 0.074
3.  General success
Forex sold, kronor purchased 140 75 53.6 1559 61.1 85.6 5.6 0.963
Forex purchased, kronor sold 14 4 28.6 1644 64.4 9.0 1.8 0.993
Total 154 79 51.3
Note:  Target currency is the German mark, which we extend beyond December 31, 1998, using the euro.  Table 5:  Success Counts for Swedish Intervention against Dollars  
January 5, 1991, to November 15, 2002, 2574 observations
Hypergeometric Distribution
Interventions Virtual Expected  Standard
Total Succsessfull Successes Successes Deviation p-value
Success criteria ##% # % # #
1.  Appreciate / Depreciate
Dollars sold, kronor purchased 28 7 25.0 1234 47.9 13.4 2.6 0.989
Dollars purchased, kronor sold 3 2 66.7 1335 51.9 1.6 0.9 0.139
     1a.  Change direction
Dollars sold, kronor purchased 28 3 10.7 657 25.5 7.1 2.3 0.952
Dollars purchased, kronor sold 3 1 33.3 656 25.5 0.8 0.8 0.162
     1b.  Accentuate movements
Dollars sold, kronor purchased 28 2 7.1 286 11.1 3.1 1.7 0.617
Dollars purchased, kronor sold 3 0 0.0 349 13.6 0.4 0.6 0.354
2.  Moderate movements
Dollars sold, kronor purchased 28 5 17.9 325 12.6 3.5 1.7 0.132
Dollars purchased, kronor sold 3 0 0.0 285 11.1 0.3 0.5 0.297
3.  General success
Dollars sold, kronor purchased 28 12 42.9 1560 60.6 17.0 2.6 0.957
Dollars purchases, kronor sold 3 2 66.7 1624 63.1 1.9 0.8 0.251
Total: 31 14 45.2
Note: Target currency is the U.S. dollar.  Table 6:  Success Counts for Swedish Intervention against Marks, Euros, and Dollars
January 6, 1991, to November 15, 2002, 2573 observations
Hypergeometric Distribution
Interventions Virtual Expected  Standard
Total Succsessfull Successes Successes Deviation p-value
Success criteria: ##% # % # #
1.  Appreciate / Depreciate
Forex sold, kronor purchased 163 64 39.3 1250 48.6 79.2 6.2 0.992
Forex purchased, kronor sold 16 3 18.8 1265 49.2 7.9 2.0 0.988
     1a.  Change direction
Forex sold, kronor purchased 163 29 17.8 584 22.7 37.0 5.2 0.929
Forex purchased, kronor sold 16 2 12.5 580 22.5 3.6 1.7 0.735
     1b.  Accentuate movements
Forex sold, kronor purchased 163 19 11.7 317 12.3 20.1 4.1 0.546
Forex purchaseh, kronor sold 16 0 0.0 322 12.5 2.0 1.3 0.883
2.  Moderate movements
Forex sold, kronor purchased 163 26 16.0 331 12.9 21.0 4.1 0.093
Forex purchased, kronor sold 16 1 6.3 327 12.7 2.0 1.3 0.622
3.  General success
Forex sold, kronor purchased 163 90 55.2 1609 62.5 101.9 6.0 0.971
Forex purchased, kronor sold 16 4 25.0 1615 62.8 10.0 1.9 0.998
Total 179 94 52.5
Note:  Target currency is the Swedish trade-weighted krona index.  Table 7:  Individual Factors in the Probit Regressions.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Swedish kronor / German mark or euro
Log Likelihood 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Constant Coefficient  Likelihood Ratio  Test
    Constant only -106.69
    Amount of intervention (abs. value) -0.049 0.000 -106.20 0.99
-0.37 0.99
    Time since last intervention (days) 0.009 0.002 -106.11 1.17
0.09 0.96
    Dollar intervention (dummy) -0.009 0.387 -105.99 1.40
-0.085 1.172
    Forward intervention (dummy) 0.008 0.833 -105.78 1.83
0.082 1.288
    Repo rate change  (dummy)
1 none none none none
    Announced repo rate change (dummy)
1 0.016 5.917 -105.35 2.70
0.162 0.003
    Interest rate spread (basis points)
1, 2 0.035 -0.189 -106.67 0.04
0.3468 -0.21
    Stock market changes (index change)
1 -0.036 0.046 -105.89 1.61
-0.32 1.26
Total observations: 154 Critical
Successful interventions: 79 Chi-square:  3.84
Unsuccessful interventions: 75
Notes: 
   1. Variable defined so that increases correspond with krona purchases and 
       decreases correspond to krona sales.    
   2. Interest-rate spread is Swedish rate minus German mark rate.  Table 8:  Individual Factors in the Probit Regressions.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Swedish kronor / U.S. dollar
Log Likelihood 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Constant Coefficient  Likelihood Ratio  Test
    Constant only -21.34
    Amount of intervention (abs. value) -0.393 0.001 -20.06 2.57
-1.34 1.28
    Time since last intervention (days) -0.242 0.002 -20.33 2.03
-1.00 1.15
    DM or euro intervention (dummy) -0.566 0.789 -19.89 2.90
-1.593 1.68
    Forward intervention (dummy) none none  none none
    Repo rate change  (dummy)
1 -0.168 5.912 -20.53 1.63
-0.730 0.004
    Announced repo rate change (dummy)
1 -0.218 5.962 -19.67 3.35
-0.928 0.005
    Interest rate spread (basis points)
1, 2 -0.122 0.007 -21.34 0.00
-0.54 0.00
    Stock market changes (index change)
1 -0.220 0.058 -21.01 0.66
-0.86 0.80
Total observations: 31 Critical
Successful interventions: 14 Chi-square:  3.84
Unsuccessful interventions: 17
Notes: 
   1. Variable defined so that increases correspond with krona purchases and 
       decreases correspond to krona sales.    
   2. Interest rate spread is Swedish rate minus U.S. rate.  Table 9:  Individual Factors in the Probit Regressions.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Trade-weighted kronor
Log Likelihood 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Constant Coefficient  Likelihood Ratio  Test
    Constant only -123.85
    Amount of intervention (abs. value) -0.074 0.000 -121.99 3.72
-0.62 1.84
    Time since last intervention (days) 0.046 0.002 -123.44 0.82
0.48 0.83
    Dollar intervention (dummy) 0.119 -0.322 -123.01 1.68
1.15 -1.29
    Forward interventions (dummy) 0.058 0.196 -123.79 0.12
0.61 0.34
    Repo rate change  (dummy)
1 0.070 -0.599 -123.10 1.50
0.75 0.00
    Announced repo rate change (dummy)
1 0.050 5.888 -122.55 2.60
0.53 0.00
    Interest rate spread (basis points)
1, 2 0.090 -1.097 -123.41 0.88
0.91 -0.87
    Stock market changes (index change)
1 0.058 0.003 -123.84 0.01
0.56 0.10
Total observations: 179 Critical
Successful interventions: 94 Chi-square:  3.84
Unsuccessful interventions: 85
Notes: 
   1. Variable defined so that increases correspond with krona purchases and 
       decreases correspond to krona sales.    
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Figure 1: Riksbank Interventions against German Marks or Euros
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Figure 2: Riksbank Interventions against U.S. Dollars
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Figure 3: Riksbank Intervention and the Trade-Weighted Krona
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